Several states in India recently held their assembly elections. Elections, along with much intrigue and political machinations, also usher in a lot of talk about the performativity of politics in India. Not least among these is the strident criticism of identity politics.[i] 

There exist two kinds of politics of identity. One kind is rooted in claims of an imagined threat to existing hegemony. For example, the portrayal of certain groups as ‘enemies’ of the Indian state, the mobilization of Hindus as victims of minority appeasement etc. This is an insidious kind of identity politics that panders to the majority. This is viewed by political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot as a type of ethnic democracy (Jaffrelot, 2019). The other kind is rooted in the demands of historically oppressed and marginalised communities for space, representation and participation in democracy. Because it challenges the political status quo (EPW Engage, 2019)  the latter kind of identity politics is generally denigrated as a divisive strategy employed by venal politicians to develop their vote banks. Far from being alienating, this type of identity politics can serve as a panacea to majoritarianism and rule by elites. Identity politics is thus not just important, but also necessary in an increasingly majoritarian polity in a country like India, rife with minorities and inequities intersecting class, caste, faith and ethnicity.

The term identity politics was first coined by the Combahee River Collective, a group of women working towards the active participation of Black women in politics in 1977. The collective group of women saw identity politics as an analysis that introduced the opportunity for Black women to be actively involved in politics, while simultaneously acting as a tool to authenticate Black women’s personal experiences (Eisenstein, 1978).

Marxists have tended largely to regard identity politics as a threat to class struggle. Having found space in public discourse in the 1980s, when neoliberal globalisation and free-market democracies started prevailing as the normative global order, identity politics is perceived as a symptom of the larger affliction that is capitalism (Karat, 2011).

Postmodernism, on the other hand, offers an assortment of identities to individuals, while advocating one’s right to pick and choose one’s prominent identity. But Postmodernists dismiss identity politics as being too essentialist and totalising (Maguire, 2016). Post-modernist thinker Jean-Francois Lyotard famously defines the postmodern as ‘incredulity towards metanarratives,’ where metanarratives are understood as totalising stories about history and the goals of the human race that ground and legitimise knowledge and cultural practises. This was further emphasized by renowned postmodernist Michel Foucault who famously declared in The Archaeology of Knowledge, “Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order”.

While postmodernism fails to recognize the material base of social conditions, Marxists have tended to be wary of identity politics as detrimental to class-based unity and solidarity. Not strictly falling into these categories, or adhering to these critiques, the way identity politics plays out in India is rather unique and embedded both in its history and historiography.

Identity Politics in India is viewed with suspicion mainly as a result of the violent partition which led to the formation of India as well as its colonial roots (EPW Engage, 2019). The Indian struggle for independence sowed the seeds for what exists today as a vehement socio-cultural intolerance towards sentiments that resemble sub-national assertions. Today, it is often considered as one of the features that make politics in India ‘dirty’ by effacement of the larger nationalistic identity as well as the flagrant use of vote-bank politics, where antagonism and rivalry between different groups are capitalised to garner votes, which results into rampant corruption. Moreover, it is perceived as a societal malaise that gives rise to communal riots, intra-national conflicts and secessionist movements.

 Even before India attained independence, the political aspirations of an independent India were largely shaped by leaders and ideologues in support of claiming a larger ‘Indian’ identity for all Indians, with a strong emphasis on the proclamation of a unitary identity, even at the cost of sub-national struggles for liberation (Stephen & Prabhakar, 2007). This is instantiated by the signing of the Poona Pact, which categorically opposed having separate electorates based on caste, in overt opposition to identity politics in colonial India (Oza, 2019) (Balakrishnan, 2020).

Nation-states have typically been perceived as monoliths, deriving this description from the Eurocentric understanding of nation-states: ‘Attempts to envision a nation in plural form lack popular legitimacy’ (Alam, 2018). India, however, is a pluralistic, multifaceted cluster of many nations within a nation-state. Despite this, homogenising tendencies exist.

Centralising tendencies have also manifested themselves through attempts at implementing projects like the Uniform Civil Code and the suffusion of ideologies like ‘Akhand Bharat’. Particularly after the general election of 2014, this ideology has gained even more ground and overt support from the government. While this may be true, even before 2014 and the resurgence of Hindutva politics since the 1990s, Hinduisation of the nation-state of India has been a constant project, evinced through the various laws enacted. The architect of the Indian Constitution, Dr Ambedkar, was in favour of the concept of the ‘United States of India’. The starting words of the proposed preamble for the United States of India read, “We the people of the territories of British India distributed into administrative units called Provinces and Centrally Administered Areas and of the territories of the Indian States…and the Indian States shall be joined together into a Body Politic for Legislative, Executive and Administrative purposes under the style The United States of India” (Ambedkar, 1945). A mock Constitution for this was formulated and submitted to the Constituent Assembly to ensure that true federalism, in keeping with its multi-ethnic ethos, was practised in independent India. However, this suggestion of Dr Ambedkar was vetoed and the constitution ended up defining India as a ‘Union of states’, implying India’s indestructible unity, thus pre-emptively endeavouring to discourage regional nationalism. Decrying this in a 1953 interview with the BBC Ambedkar remarked, “we have got a social structure which is incompatible with parliamentary democracy” (Judges and Lawyers, n.d.).

The imposition of integration on federally, regionally, as well as linguistically heterogeneous people, serves as an impediment to democracy by thwarting the rich diversity of India. It serves as a ploy to forcibly assimilate the many, distinctive communities that constitute India as a nation-state, under the guise of unification and nation-building. Such monolithisation, coupled with concerted efforts of the current dispensation at harkening to the underpinning Hindu culture (Jain & Lasseter, Reuters, 2018) of India is invariably developing into a ‘creed of majoritarianism’ (Gandhi, 2017).

The way majoritarian identity has crystallised in India needs careful and urgent attention. Article 17 of the Indian Constitution states—’Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of “Untouchability” shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law’ (The Indian Constitution, n.d.). Though Article 17 abolishes untouchability, the caste system has remained unchanged, and still exists and reinforces itself. This has unfolded through both ostensibly harmless, ‘cultural’ forms of Brahminization like endogamy, as well as blatantly harmful ones like caste atrocities. Based on NCRB (National Crime Records Bureau) data, in the past 10 years, about 422,000 crimes were committed against Dalits. Every week, 21 Dalit women are reported to be raped (Badhwar, 2019).

Globally Islamophobia and market-driven security states saw a rise in the post 9/11 world. However Indian anti-terror laws have targeted the Muslims of India since the 1960s. Alienated and ghettoised, the Muslim community of India has been assailed for not just being foreign invaders, but also for cultural practices and the general social anomie experienced by the community post-independence on account of being viewed with suspicion. While it has certainly been enhanced in the recent past, due to the erosion of Indian institutions as bulwarks against totalitarian sentiments, the endemic estrangement of Indian Muslims has been both incremental and inherent. Not least of these are the recent laws like CAA/NRC (Vishwanath & Sheriff, 2019), the Babri Masjid verdict (Mukhopadhyay, 2021), the rampant lynching of minorities with negligible convictions (Mander, 2019), the recent horrific incident of Sulli deals/Bulli bai auctions (Purkayastha, 2022) etc.

In light of the rise of already present majoritarian sentiments, identity politics has given the marginalised communities of the country a platform to form solidarities and demand political say and heft. In a highly inequitable caste society, it was identity politics that helped enact the Mandal reforms of the 90s which offered socio-economic mobility to many by attempting to level the playing field. Despite being a numerical minority Indian Muslims are spread across states. Identarian forays into politics and intelligentsia are what offered them the voice to place demands, effect changes and partake in the democratic process.

While dangers of divisiveness do exist, India’s pluralistic secularism demands recognition and fortification of the multicultural and multi-linguistic ethos of India. An exercise in identity politics is thus pertinent as it seeks to redistribute power more equitably and contributes to the robustness of Indian democracy.

References:

Alam, A. (2018). India: The Struggle of Identity Politics in India. Policy Perspectives Foundation.

Ambedkar, B. (1945). States and Minorities (Dr B.R. Ambedkar, 1945). Retrieved from https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical_constitutions/states_and_minorities__dr__b_r__ambedkar__1945__1st%20January%201945

Badhwar, N. (2019, 8 23). Livemint. Retrieved from livemint.com: https://www.livemint.com/mint-lounge/features/the-urgent-impatience-of-suraj-yengde-1566555755323.html

Balakrishnan, U. (2020, 4 14). The Hindu. Retrieved from thehindu.com: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/ambedkar-and-the-poona-pact/article31333684.ece

Eisenstein, Z. (1978). Blackpast. Retrieved from blackpast.org: https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/combahee-river-collective-statement-1977/

EPW Engage. (2019, 5 6). https://www.epw.in/engage/article/why-identity-politics-caste-legitimate. Economic and Political Weekly.

Gandhi, G. (2017, 7 27). The Economic Times. Retrieved from economictimes.com: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/will-indians-place-the-country-above-their-creed-or-creed-above-country/articleshow/59780761.cms?from=mdr

Jaffrelot, C. (2019). A De Facto Ethnic Democracy?: Obliterating and Targeting the Other, Hindu Vigilantes, and the Ethno-StateObliterating and Targeting the Other, Hindu Vigilantes, and the Ethno-State. In Majoritarian State (pp. 41-68). doi:10.1093/oso/9780190078171.003.0003

Jain, R., & Lasseter, T. (2018, 3 6). Reuters. Retrieved from reuters.com: https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/india-modi-culture/

Jain, R., & Tom, L. (2018, 3 6). Reuters. Retrieved from reuters.com: https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/india-modi-culture/

Judges and Lawyers. (n.d.). Retrieved from www.judgesandlawyers.com: https://judgesandlawyers.com/dr-ambedkars-1953-interview-with-bbc-transcript/

Karat, P. (2011). The Challenge of Identity Politics. The Marxist, pp. 40-50.

Maguire, L. (2016, 7 14). Philosophy Talk. Retrieved from philosophytalk.org: https://www.philosophytalk.org/blog/identity-politics

Mander, H. (2019, 10 16). The Hindu. Retrieved from thehindu.com: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lynching-the-scourge-of-new-india/article29693818.ece

Mukhopadhyay, N. (2021, 12 14). The Print. Retrieved from theprint.in: https://theprint.in/pageturner/excerpt/why-scs-collective-verdict-on-babri-masjid-is-a-worrying-sign-for-judiciary-and-india/780766/

Oza, P. (2019, 8). Dalit Identity Politics As A History Of Nation. Gap Gyan, 2(3), 135-139. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/M9.FIGSHARE.12684437.V1

Purkayastha, P. (2022, 1 22). Newsclick. Retrieved from newsclick. in: https://www.newsclick.in/weaponising-hate-apps-sulli-deals-and-bulli-baia

Stephen, C., & Prabhakar, R. (2007). Velivada. Retrieved from velivada.com: https://velivada.com/2020/05/07/revisiting-the-poona-pact/

The Indian Constitution. (n.d.). Retrieved from theindianconstitution.com: https://theindianconstitution.com/article-17-abolition-untouchability/

Vishwanath, A., & Sheriff, K. (2019, 12 25). The Indian Express. Retrieved from indianexpress.com: https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-citizenship-amendment-act-nrc-caa-means-6180033/

[i] The term “identity politics” indicates wide range of political activity and theorizing founded in the shared experiences of injustice of members of certain social groups.

***

Maitreyee is a currently unemployed, independent anthropological researcher. She is interested in ethnographic approach to subjects like inequities, decoloniality, social-economic mobility, etc.