Introduction
“What is the idea of India”? I posed this question to some of my colleagues and friends at IIT Gandhinagar. The responses I received are personal, positioned, situational, observational and experiential despite the presence of a vast literature on this specific subject.
The idea of India is a murky terrain given that it does not render an appropriate conceptual delineation for every “Indian citizen,”[i] irrespective of their caste, colour, creed and religion. The adhesive structure through which our democratic foundation and the cardinal republican virtues are held together, albeit loosely, is not cohesive. The reason it is not cohesive can be attributed to the fact that the “supposed” and “polarising” idea of India lives in “fragments” (fragments of caste, class, religion, high culture, low culture, elite, subaltern, power, politics and identities) since there is no homogeneous, uniform and singular vision of India. Religious divides, caste politics, ethnic turmoil, hierarchy by descent, and multiple pockets of indigenous identities have disintegrated this very idea into communitarian puzzles and made them a site of contention among various social groups. Along these lines, it would not be far off to stress that an “idea of India” is an imagined and nonviable idea of India in both theory and praxis, at least in today’s politics. It is a sum of beleaguered loci of propagandist power play among divisive groups, pushed by a common agenda to formulate a singular identity of India predicated on “self-motivated narratives”. To borrow Gopal Guru’s term, these distinct locales of identity politics are analogous to a “cracked mirror” where separate pieces are clamped together through a common centre of gravity! In relation to such trajectories, does a Dalit envisioned India fall into the same trap? If not, in what ways is it different from the above agendas?
The Idea of India: Nationalist Pontification and Contemporary Renditions
India, as a nation, is long held to be the aggregate of paradox and contrariety. It is a country that, according to Shashi Tharoor, showcases a “nebulous quality which the analyst of Indian nationalism is ultimately left with; to borrow a phrase from Amartya Sen, it is an idea — the idea of India” (Tharoor, 2020). However, Amartya Sen is not the only Indian scholar who endeavoured to rediscover and reaffirm this idea of India that is essentially a byproduct of the elite nationalist discourse. Through the writings of Megnad Desai, Ramachandra Guha, Sunil Khilnani, and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, an attempt was made to reconfigure the scattered nationalist narratives into a unified discourse to re-glorify this “hackneyed” idea in a more academically sophisticated manner by predominantly taking four tropes into account: “antiquity-continuity, diversity-unity, massivity-democracy and multi-confessionality-secularity” (Anderson, 2012, p. 12). Such attempts to proffer this “Indian oneness” are categorically lambasted by other scholars for narrowly concentrating the idea of India into the binary of Gandhi and Nehru. Perry Anderson is one of those theoreticians whose vitriolic counter-narratives carved a separate niche in historical studies. Condemning Gandhi and Nehru, Anderson, in his book, “The Indian Ideology”, mentioned “the idea of a subcontinental unity stretching back six thousand years” rooted in Nehru’s “impression of oneness” has not gone away (Anderson, 2012, p. 14). Further, about the “Congress party’s leap of faith”, Gandhi himself believed that “India was one undivided land made by nature, in which we were one nation before they came to India” and “we Indians are one as no two Englishmen are” (Anderson, 2012, p. 14). Moreover, Anderson posited that India had never been a united nation, and any idea perpetrated on this line was a fabrication. Also, Indian nationalism had a religious underpinning as the Congress was a Hindu majoritarian party with celebrated leaders like Gandhi and Nehru who could never escape their deep-seated Hindu proclivity (Anderson, 2012, p. 13). This way, the recent efforts to homogenise the idea of India through Gandhi and Nehru are nothing but a facile and unipartite experiment. Albeit the fact that Anderson has been criticised by scholars like Nivedita Menon for being ignorant of Indian histories due to his colonial hangover, rooted in the superiority of the British ideology (Menon, 2014, p. 168), it is nevertheless incontrovertible that “the potpourri of an Indian self” (Anderson, 2012, p. 19), can be better explicated through “Indian strangeness” than mechanically executed “Indian oneness”.
The Dalit Idea of India
As suggested, the idea of India is essentially a corollary of the elite nationalist discourse. There were no other stakeholders when this idea was being manufactured and promulgated. Later, various social scientists who rediscovered this idea relied heavily on “sacrosanct” nationalist politics. This way, the entire phenomenon was not mutually agreed upon by every Indian citizen, regardless of their social identity and economic standing. Thus, when this idea of India wrapped up in an elitist makeover was highlighted and pushed down people’s throats, the responses and reciprocation were lukewarm from the marginalised groups like the Dalits. Since this very idea is still at play, there are resentments and restricted fulminations against it even to this day! Such an idea of India is exclusionary and invidious that does not pay heed to the Dalit voices and consider their stories and concerns noteworthy. Therefore, the elite idea of India, originating from highbrow nationalist ideologies, has no place for the Dalits. These nationalist ideologies, according to Gopal Guru, are quintessentially expressed through the language of “Desi”, which is posed as an Indian answer to the language of “Derivative” exported from the West (Guru, 201, p. 37). However, highlighting “Desi” as an “Indian answer” is troublesome because “Desi” incorporates the elements of Western-influenced Indian literati and disregards everything that sits beyond the traditional circle of power. Hence to counter both “Desi” and “Derivative”, a “negative language” was deployed. This “negative language” seeks to dismantle Western elitism. In addition, it negates the mechanical language of unity posited by the nationalist tradition and complements the language of “Beyond” (Guru, 2011, p. 38-39).
The idea of a Dalit India is located in this language of “Beyond” at the fringes and margins of India. The goal of “Beyond” is to discuss anything that does not fit into the paradigm of “Desi” and “Derivative”, such as Dalit literary, social, and political imagination, due to their persistent separation from the belligerent Brahmanical hegemony (Guru, 2011, p. 38). Nevertheless, the language of “Beyond” is not given adequate notice in the nation’s scholastic undertakings and customary political practices. Hence to bring this language of “Beyond” to the forefront, scholars like Ambedkar, Phule and Periyar used the idea of “Derivative” since this is the language that literati embrace as it reeks of intellectual snobbery. Nonetheless, “Desi”, being refined and arguably Indian, is like “Derivative” in many ways. Then, why did people like Ambedkar use “Derivative” rather than “Desi”? Postcolonial critics like Ganguly blame Ambedkar for insinuating such hypocrisy. However, Gopal Guru believes, “If Ambedkar did it, what was wrong” (Gur, 2001, p.39)? The reason he resorted to “Derivative” is that he was denied access to locally available “Desi”. He did not blindly imitate “Derivative” but used it to shed light on the underground Dalit voices. To Ambedkar, the idea of Dalit India cannot be realised even through constitutional validation if such Dalit voices are not mainstreamed. Because, in most cases, the constitution would only work as a piece of document to subvert humanist ideals, not as a source of equality!
Following the same lines, Sukhadeo Thorat makes a sharp distinction between the constitutional idea of India and Ambedkar’s idea of India. According to him, the constitutional idea of the nation is vested in “the conception of nation/nationalism stemming from the Constitution and its Preamble” (Thorat, 2022). Ambedkar’s idea of India is manifested in the “conception of nation/nationalism through the essence of the constitution” as well as his idea of “consciousness of kind” (Thorat, 2022). Ambedkar’s idea of Dalit India is imperative since the constitution has failed to uphold its virtues. This idea is impossible without “constant communication” (Thorat, 2022), and such communication, in turn, hinges on the idea of fraternity. Since fraternity promotes “a mental attitude of fair play and equality towards one’s compatriots”, the lack of it “undermines all efforts to strengthen the nation” (Thorat, 2022). Therefore, if our nation is devoid of fraternity, we will never be able to achieve the substantial idea of a nation. The Dalit idea of India, manifested in Ambedkarite principles, prioritises this sense of fraternity among Indian citizens as one and united sans the customary hierarchy of power. Yet, caste divides have forced ‘fraternity’ to remain as a preambular virtue, barring it from coming to fruition in real life and hence rendering the idea of India virtually pointless.
The Idea of a Dalit India
Another alternative approach against this elitist makeover of the idea of India is the “Dalitization” of India. “Dalitization” is not a radical initiative against people’s typical understanding. It is not tantamount to “Sanskritization” or “Hinduization”. Instead, according to Selvin Raj Gnana, “Dalitization is the process of getting the provisions vested for Dalit-Bahujans” (Gnana, 2018, p. 69). The term was popularized by Kancha Ilaiah in his book, “Why I am not a Hindu?” Ilaiah believes, as Brahmanical superiority traces their supposed legality in the Hindu scriptures, the Brahmanical nationalism that is evinced through the usurpation of politico-bureaucratic power, similarly seeks its justification through Swami Vivekananda and Mahatma Gandhi (Ilaiah, 1996). Figures like Vivekananda and Gandhi shrewdly made attempts to reinforce the Brahmanical hegemony through the systemic reiteration of the Vedas that further legitimised and solidified the “Chatur-Varna” system (Ilaiah, 1996). Contrary to the Brahmanical forces, the idea of a Dalit-Bahujan India stresses democratic social systems. This democracy is not, however, constitutionally mandated “nugatory” democracy since the actualisation of the constitution remains “the political horizon that Ambedkarite and other humanists fight towards” (Thorat, 2022). Instead, this democracy underscores the egalitarian values through which every citizen can be free and equal, minus their caste identity. Besides, the idea of a Dalit India seeks changes through the reformation of the social order by abolishing private property, instilling faith in its labour power and rescuing the “oppressed” even within the Brahmanical order, such as the women who are only deemed useful for production purposes. I believe the fundamental difference between the “Dalit idea of India” and the “idea of a Dalit India” is that while the former underscores the importance of a reciprocal dialogue between the ‘privileged’ and the “marginalised” castes and equal participation of both to achieve fraternity, the latter takes matter into its own hands and strives to disrupt the Brahmanical order even when the participation in social dialogues is not equal and identical.
Is Indian Democracy the Answer?
Speaking of India’s capacity to amalgamate various heterogeneous units into a homogeneous whole, Nehru once famously remarked:
“India is a country held together by strong but invisible threads … a myth and an idea, a dream and a vision, and yet very real and present and pervasive” – Jawaharlal Nehru (Tharoor, 2000, p. 7).
The Nehruvian idea of India, rooted in the nonpareil principles of democracy, is quintessentially touted as a heterogeneous, cosmopolitan, and broad-gauged idea of India. The socialist and secular outlooks of Nehru, which were petrified in his lived experiences through a colonial-feudal duopoly and manifested in the Congress juggernaut, had played a significant part in limning such an idea. However, questions like to what extent the idea was successful, or was it successful at all, had catapulted myriads of alternative discussions in India’s politico-historical deliberation. If India is a democracy, what kind of, and whose democracy is she? Does constitutionally – validated democracy do justice to her stated ideals of equality and sovereignty? Being astounded by the oddity of the spectacular yet turbulent India, Macaulay called her “the strangest of all political anomalies” (Miscellaneous Writings and Speeches, 2008). Just like the state herself, democracy in India functions incongruously and bizarrely. Shashi Tharoor put it brilliantly: “Amid India’s myriad problems, it is democracy that has given Indians of every imaginable caste, creed, culture, and causes the chance to break free of their lot” (Tharoor, 2020). Thus, Indian democracy is a source of both hope and hopelessness. It behaves as a gift and a scourge: a gift for those who can manipulate power politics and a scourge for those who are manipulated by power politics.
Despite being a peremptory endeavour to tie India’s miscellany into a common thread, the Nehruvian idea of India turned out to be trifling and hollow theoretical sermons of a polarising visionary. India, as we know, has systematically become a nation-state of divides, differences and diversion where the hegemonic social gradation of the “Haut Monde” against the perennially disenfranchised “Subalterns” like the Dalits permeates through every fabric of her being. A remark from Ambedkar in 1949 apropos of such a longitudinal division of power, wealth and capital in favour of a handful of people would provide context to the argument:
“In politics, we will be recognising the principle of one man, one vote and one value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic structure, continue to deny the principle of one man, one value. How long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions” (Mudgal, 2015, p. 275)?
These contradictions, exhibited by Ambedkar, have squandered Indian democracy as the common melting point of assorted social, politico-religious and ethnic identities. Instead, it has exposed a massive hole of how India, through her democratic institutions and constitutional strength, can never survive on and with a single idea of nation and nationality or as a simple geopolitical unit thronged with people. Taking these exact anomalies as a point of reference, Ambedkar commented, “A nation is not a country in the physical sense, whatever degree of geographical unity it may possess. A nation is not a people synthesised by a common culture derived from a common language, common religion or common race…..” This is a radical departure from how a nation is generally imagined in today’s variegated political contexts. The idea of a nation can no longer be demonstrated within a singular framework, at least within the milieu of common nationalist sentiment, since it parleys with power exercised by only a handful. Although a nationalist need not necessarily be a power-monger, they can never deny the deep undercurrents of chauvinism that run parallel with the over-amplified national glory-hunting.
This way, a nationalist often runs the risk of being a “true blue dyed-in-the-wool” conservative in many instances. Unfortunately, though, due to our conventional societal constructs, we tend to glamorise nationalism as the only and true binding force of a nation, irrespective of many socio-economic divides. Suffice to say, this linear, sketchy and cursory understanding of nationalism has quite patently catered to the rise of Hindutva politics in the modern Indian nation over the past decades. Thus, nationalism should no longer be the sole binding agency because, when forced upon people, such an idea may result in the opposite of what nationalism intends to achieve. Rather, the idea of a nation should be an aggregate of the feelings “of the corporate sentiment of oneness that makes those who are charged with it feel that they are kith and kin…..It is a feeling of ‘consciousness of kind’ that binds those within the limits of kindred. It is a longing (a strong feeling of wanting together) to belong to one’s own group….” (Ambedkar, 1979, p. 309; Ravidas, 2010, p. 148).
Conclusion – The Negation of an Elite Idea of India
Amid all these fragmented ideas of India, one crucial question takes the most limelight: is the negation of an elite idea of India possible? Does “negation” entail dismantling the entire order, which is dated, divisive and discriminatory? Also, what are the ways to achieve such a state if it is possible? Notwithstanding the ‘Savarna’ chicanery in fabricating dishonest Dalit sympathy in several social, economic, and political spaces, the primary focus of the privileged castes lies in maintaining the status quo for all intents and purposes by propagating their “elite” idea of India. But is this what we need? Certainly not! I believe what we need is a combination of both the “idea of Dalit-Bahujan India” and the “Dalit-Bahujan idea of India”. This blended idea, contrary to its apparent appearance, is not retaliation against the ongoing Brahmanisation in a growing Hindutva paradigm. Instead, it is a recantation from an asymmetry of domination and subjugation instilled in the postcolonial Indian psyche by the contours of Brahmanism. The Dalit idea of India, thus, does not focus on the Dalit hegemony of the country’s social order per se; rather, the idea entails equality and equity in every walk of life envisaged by Dalit politics. To what extent we can achieve this idea by negating the Hindutva behemoth depends on the progress of the collective Dalit resistance and the unfolding of future events in India. However, hoping for a positive “peripeteia” in such a large and continuous struggle for equality would be nothing short of a figment of romantic imagination.
References:
Ambedkar, B. R., & Moon, V. (1979). Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, Writings and Speeches. India: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra. Government Press.
Anderson, P. (2013). The Indian Ideology, United Kingdom: Verso Books.
Chatterjee, P. (1993). The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, United Kingdom: Princeton University Press.
Gnana, S. R. (2018). The Caste System, Dalitization and its Implications in Contemporary India. International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, 10(7), 65–71.
Guru, G. (2011). The Idea of India: Derivative, Desi and Beyond. Economic and Political Weekly, 46(37), 36–42.
Ilaiah, K. (1996). Why I am not a Hindu: A Sudra Critique of Hindutva, Philosophy, Culture, and Political Economy, India: Samya.
“Miscellaneous Writings and Speeches – Volume 4: Thomas Babington Macaulay”. (2008). Project Gutenberg.
Menon, N. (2014). Perry Anderson and the British Ideology. Constellations, 21, 164-174.
Mudgal, V. (2015). Claiming India from Below: Activism and Democratic Transformation, India: Taylor & Francis.
Ravidas, A. (2010). Ambedkar on Indian History, India: ABD Publishers.
Tharoor, S. (2012). India: From Midnight to the Millennium and Beyond, United States: Arcade.
Tharoor, S. (2020). The idea of India. The Times of India.
Thorat, S. (2022). “Can India ever achieve the Dalit idea of the Nation imagined by Babasaheb Ambedkar?” Scroll. in. https://scroll.in/article/1021759/can-india-ever-achieve-the-dalit-idea-of-the-nation-imagined-by-babasaheb-ambedkar, retrieved on 5th July 2023.
[i]Citizenship in India itself is a frail concept. Being a citizen requires the right to enjoy equal freedom and opportunities, not just the privilege to cast votes. In a caste-laden society, such equalities are distant dreams. Thus, if ‘India’ is the identity of the ‘Indians’, and such an identity is realised through the notion of ‘citizenship’, what kind of ‘citizenship’ is it then?
Acknowledgment: I express my deepest gratitude to my doctoral supervisor Prof. Madhumita Sengupta for her valuable suggestions in understanding, formulating, and articulating different facets of the idea of India through her course and several one-on-one meetings.
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Manas Patra is a PhD research scholar in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Gandhinagar.